The literature on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is divided with regard to his notion of subjectivity. Some authors claim that Deleuze has rejected the concept of subjectivity or has made it redundant; whereas others believe that Deleuze attempts to provide a foundation for subjectivity. In this thesis, I argue that Deleuze’s early works are permeated with a theory of subjectivity, and I develop this theory through a close reading of these works. More precisely, taking as a guiding thread the post-Kantian demand, first formulated by Salomon Maimon, that transcendental philosophy should provide real, genetic conditions of subjective experience instead of mere conditions of possibility, I chronologically examine Deleuze’s monographs on Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Bergson, in order to put together a rigorous and comprenhensive Deleuzian theory of subjectivity.
